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1. Background 
1.1 Introduction 
There has been on-going discussion regarding the alignment of cloud computing services to a range 
of European policy objectives. This paper provides an initial outline of some of legal and regulatory 
aspects arising from recent calls for establishing a Europe-only cloud.
2
 Following Edward Snowden’s 
revelations of mass surveillance and data collection by the US National Security Agency (“NSA”) and 
other national intelligence agencies, such concerns came to the forefront with calls for a Europe-only 
cloud, also referred to as the “Schengen cloud” or “Schengen Internet”,
3
 apparently involving 
constraints on the routing of data.
4
 Any Europe-only cloud could impact severely on data exchanges 
between Europe and other regions, such as the US. 
 
In August 2013, German telecommunications provider Deutsche Telekom (DT)
5
 and United Internet, 
who together provide about 2/3 of all German email addresses, announced an "E-mail made in 
Germany" initiative
6
, which would employ only “secure data centers in Germany” for email traffic and 
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3
 Within the Schengen area, EU citizens may cross state borders freely without being subjected to border checks. 
This area encompasses all but six of the EU Member States and all four EFTA countries. Of the six EU states 
that are currently outside Schengen, Croatia and Cyprus are obliged to join and it is a longer-term aim for 
Bulgaria and Romania also to do so. The UK and Ireland have opted out of the Schengen Agreement and that 
status is not expected to change in the foreseeable future. It is therefore unclear whether the UK and Ireland 
would be excluded from any planned Schengen Internet or cloud network. 
4
 In this paper we use "routing" in the popular lay sense of routing at the network level, rather than more fine-
grained application-specific routing. 
5
 Which is 32% owned by the German government - http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-usa-spying-
germany-idUSBRE99O09S20131025. 
6
 http://www.e-mail-made-in-germany.de/ and see http://www.telekom.com/media/company/192834 (DT's press 
release announcing this initiative). 
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use SSL encryption in transmission.
7
 This would (according to United Internet’s head) make it 
“impossible for any ‘foreign jurisdictions’ to gain access”.
8
 Reportedly they would avoid routing such 
traffic through US hosted infrastructure.
9
 However, this initiative only applies to emails between the 
relevant German email services,
10
 not emails to persons outside Germany,
11
 and data at rest on those 
servers would be unencrypted,
12
 leading to suggestions that this move represented “marketing” rather 
than enhanced protection,
13
 and would make Internet use more expensive.
14
 That month also, Thierry 
Breton of European cloud provider Atos (and France’s former Minister of Economy, Finance and 
Industry) proposed "a kind of Schengen" for data.
15
 In fact the idea of a kind of digital Schengen area 
is not new, having been suggested in 2011 by the Presidency of the Council of the EU’s Law 
Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) in the context of cybercrime.
16
 
 
Subsequently, in October 2013, apparently after a private meeting with the German government,
17
 DT 
declared its aim to agree with other Internet providers that German Internet traffic would be routed 
                                                     
7
 http://www.zdnet.com/deutsche-telekom-and-united-internet-launch-made-in-germany-email-in-response-to-
prism-7000019266/. 
8
 http://www.dw.de/german-companies-to-automatically-encrypt-customers-emails/a-17010661. 
9
 http://www.telecoms.com/170312/deutsche-telekom-avoids-us-servers-another-secure-email-shuts/. 
10
 N. 7. 
11
 http://www.dw.de/germany-looks-to-erect-it-barrier/a-17203480. 
12
 Third party access to such data would be granted “only in compliance with German law” (n. 8). Deutsche 
Telekom started reporting publicly on its provision of information to security authorities in June 2014: 
http://www.telekom.com/corporate-responsibility/data-protection/More+Articles/239498. 
13
 http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/08/crypto-experts-blast-german-e-mail-providers-secure-data-storage-
claim/ and n. 19. 
There are also reports that the German intelligence agency passes communications metadata information to the 
NSA in any event, at least relating to non-German citizens. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-
intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html. 
14
 “…it would be possible to keep email conversations inside German borders. But in doing so, the idea of the 
fastest and cheapest way would have to be given up. Additionally, investments in network infrastructure would 
also be required. This could make internet usage more expensive. It would be even more difficult to process the 
entire internet traffic through domestic lines and intersections. The important Root-Nameservers are mainly 
based in the US… Setting up a ‘national internet [with] an expensive and complex network of servers and 
infrastructure, like the ones in Saudi Arabia and in Iran, would be needed’” http://www.dw.de/deutsche-telekom-
plans-for-a-national-internet/a-17171714. 
However, these views are not necessarily accurate, for several reasons. Servers already exist in much European 
infrastructure (both middleboxes for deep packet inspection (DPI) and caching/proxy, but also large scale content 
delivery networks (CDNs) - e.g. for IPTV) so there's little cost there. DNS deployment is extremely cheap. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran run a lot of expensive (US) censorship technology, which seems less applicable in more liberal 
states  in Europe. Work such as P4P aims at traffic localisation 
(http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=032002XVIJS0), meaning that hosting cloud within ISPs would 
reduce costs. Having traffic leave an Autonomous System that operates a defined routing policy - see further n.2 
- incurs peering charges which can be significant, so ISPs are already strongly incentivised to keep traffic local. 
This also provides lower latency, i.e. better performance and speed, to users. Putting servers further away would 
be slower – whether it would be cheaper or not would depend. Root servers for .com are mirrored multiple times, 
but in any case DNS lookups are cached, so once the first lookup has been resolved it's irrelevant where the 
DNS server is. 
15
 http://www.europe1.fr/Economie/Breton-creer-une-sorte-de-Schengen-des-donnees-1620759/. 
16
 “The Presidency of the LEWP presented its intention to propose concrete measures towards creating a single 
secure European cyberspace with a certain ‘virtual Schengen border’ and ‘virtual access points’ whereby the 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) would block illicit contents on the basis of the EU ‘black-list’.” 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207181%202011%20INIT para 8. The workability and 
implications of that proposal were criticised, e.g. http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/eu-proposes-
continental-wide-great-firewall-27834. 
17
 http://gigaom.com/2013/10/14/why-keeping-internet-traffic-within-borders-is-a-tall-order/ and 
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/79286.html. Note that the Gigaom article was mainly regarding Brazil, 
where infrastructure is far less developed than within Europe, and there are vast distances between urban areas 
compared with in most of Europe. Also, Brazil has deployed far less infrastructure to address this issue than 
Europe, with very few fibreoptic cables across the Amazon basin, so that many communications are via satellite 
and thus it can be more efficient (both in terms of time and cost) to route traffic with domestic endpoints (e.g. from 
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only through domestic connections in order to keep German Internet traffic within German borders),
18
 
creating a German-only “Internetz”,
19
 with the next step being to expand this to the Schengen area.
20
 
It was said that any “national routing” plan would require the commercial cooperation of other such 
providers including Telefonica and Vodafone,
21
 or legislation to compel such cooperation,
22
 without 
which “there is a risk that competitors or users might file lawsuits claiming discrimination or the 
curtailment of data traffic”.
23
 Another German Internet service provider QSC queried the proposal’s 
feasibility, stating that it was not possible to determine clearly whether data was being routed 
nationally or internationally.
24
 It has been suggested that DT’s proposal was “a public relations 
move”,
25
 for political gain or to increase DT revenue.
26
 Many ISPs use the Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) to manage routing within and between networks under different administrative (ie 
organisational) control, so it is technically feasible to route in line with the proposed constraints, if 
ISPs make the appropriate changes both to their technical arrangements and their commercial 
arrangements regarding their mutual interchange of data.
27
 German Interior Minister Hans-Peter 
Friedrich confirmed briefly in November 2013 that he wanted to “incorporate an IT-Security law in the 
upcoming coalition agreement that would provide a legal framework for hindering the interception of 
data exchanged [within Germany and Europe] by foreign intelligence.”
28
 A draft bill has been 
published by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, not mentioning foreign intelligence as such, 
but including new obligations for technical security measures regarding critical infrastructure, public 
telecommunications networks and providers of telemedia services, to minimum higher standards, 
which should help to reduce interception and other security risks.
29
 
 
In February 2014, Germany’s Chancellor Merkel met with France’s President Hollande to discuss 
“building up a European communication network to avoid emails and other data passing through the 
United States… we'll talk about European providers that offer security for our citizens, so that one 
shouldn't have to send emails and other information across the Atlantic. Rather, one could build up a 
communication network inside Europe”. Hollande’s office apparently agreed with the proposals and 
emphasised the importance of a joint initiative.
30
 Merkel was not proposing “a European internet” 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Recife to Sao Paulo) via international fibre up to and back from the US. In Europe, "national-only" routing may be 
complex to configure but would be far more practicable than in Brazil. 
18
 “We want to guarantee that no byte between senders and recipients within Germany will even temporarily 
cross the border”. http://www.dw.de/telekom-hopes-to-stave-off-nsa-snoops-by-keeping-internet-traffic-in-
germany/a-17154274 The plans were reiterated by DT’s then CEO in November 2013: http://www.dw.de/no-
welcome-for-deutsche-telekom-national-internet-plans-from-eu-commission/a-17219111. 
19
 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/deutsche-telekom-pushes-all-german-internet-safe-from-spying-a-
933013.html. 
20
 N. 3. 
21
 http://rt.com/news/deutsche-telekom-internet-spies-176/. Telefonica Germany was said to be “in early 
discussions on national routing with other groups” while Vodafone was “evaluating if and how” to implement the 
DT proposal (n. 5). 
22
 “Thomas Kremer, the executive in charge of data privacy and legal affairs for the German operator, said the 
group needed to sign connection agreements with three additional operators to make a national routing possible. 
‘If this were not the case, one could think of a legislative solution,’ he said” (n. 5). 
23
 N. 19. 
24
 http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/it/spionage-schutz-telekom-will-innerdeutschen-internetverkehr-uebers-
ausland-stoppen/8919692.html. 
25
 N. 5. 
26
 http://www.technewsworld.com/story/79286.html. 
27
 In practice, routing configuration tends to follow higher-level (typically business) agreements. See n. 2 for more 
details. 
28
 N. 11. 
29
 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz). 
See http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/EN/2014/08/it-security-bill.html and 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/News/informationsheet-it-security-
bill.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. This is in advance of the proposed EU Network and Information Security Directive 
COM(2013) 48 final, with similar aims, which is currently going through the legislative process. 
30
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-germany-france-idUSBREA1E0IG20140215. 
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distinct from the worldwide web, but was “looking for an option in which Europeans could use an 
option in which their data would be stored inside the EU and would not leave Europe”.
31
 
 
German-only routing has been summarised as, “when the sender and recipient of any Internet data 
are in Germany their data is not sent via another country, as it sometimes is today”,
32
 or Europe-only 
routing envisaged as involving “EU-wide statutory requirements that electronic transmissions between 
EU residents stay within the territory of the EU… that all data generated within the EU not be 
unnecessarily routed outside of the EU”.
33
 
 
If these proposals are to progress, what exactly would a “Europe-only cloud” or national cloud entail; 
how if at all could it be achieved technically and legally, and what would be the consequences?
34
 
There seem to be two main possibilities regarding the use of any “Europe-only cloud” that is created: 
require use of only the “Europe-only cloud”, and no other cloud services; or, allow users the choice of 
whether to use the “Europe-only cloud” or not. It is possible that the two could be combined, e.g. 
public sector bodies may be required to use Europe-only cloud, but private sector users may be given 
a choice. Either way, some reliable but flexible method of assuring users that a particular service or 
provider falls with the “Europe-only cloud” category may also be needed, such as certifications or 
seals, to supplement any contractual representations.
35
 
 
This paper seeks to lay the foundation for considering the legal and regulatory feasibility and broader 
implications of a Europe-only cloud. But first, we outline the policy objectives that may underlie the 
Europe-only cloud proposals. 
1.2 Policy issues – why a Europe-only cloud? 
A Europe-only cloud approach may seek to meet a range of policy objectives. A chief explicit 
objective is to prevent unmediated access to European data by foreign law enforcement authorities 
(LEAs). While the current debate places foreign LEA access as the central policy objective, it should 
be noted that the Commission’s original cloud communication in 2012
36
 refers in Key Action 3 (3.5) to 
a European Cloud Partnership, stating: 
 
“The ECP does not aim at creating a physical cloud computing infrastructure. Rather, via 
procurement requirements that will be promoted by participating Member States and public 
authorities for use throughout the EU, its aim is to ensure that the commercial offer in Europe 
is adapted to European needs.” 
 
This illustrates that the "European cloud" debate pre-dates the Snowden revelations. 
 
Another objective might be to encourage domestic cloud providers and develop domestic 
infrastructure, which others might term economic protectionism or state aid. Protecting European data 
from foreign LEA access is also couched in terms of protecting fundamental rights from inappropriate 
interference, particularly rights to private life and to data protection. A related objective could be to 
encourage the use of cloud computing by European users and the development of a single digital 
market for cloud computing in Europe,
37
 which some might consider they would be more willing to do 
if they had more confidence and trust that their data would be protected, i.e. based on users’ 
perceptions of cloud computing and security including LEA access. 
 
                                                     
31
 http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/merkel-hollande-lay-foundation-p-news-533560. 
32
 N. 46. 
33
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013-14%20-
1377Report-final.pdf pg. 5. 
34
 As the issues are largely similar, in this paper we discuss only “Europe-only cloud”, but much of the analysis 
will apply to a “German-only cloud” or other national cloud. 
35
 See http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441182, 2.4, and http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405971, 4.10.2, and n. 83 pgs. 5, 
12. 
36
 Commission, Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe, COM(2012) 529. 
37
 E.g. the Trusted Cloud for Europe initiative (n. 65). 
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While some drivers behind policy objectives may be expressly stated, others may remain undeclared. 
For instance, in relation to the promotion of Europe-only cloud, DT’s declared driver is the protection 
of German citizens’ privacy, but it may also be seeking commercial advantage over its US rivals. 
While a declared driver of many states is the restriction of foreign LEA access, an undeclared driver 
may be the facilitation of access by the state’s own domestic LEAs. 
 
Some policy objectives may be in tension or conflict with each other, for example, in relation to 
fundamental rights, protection of privacy may need to be balanced against freedom of expression, 
which includes the right to receive information, which a Europe-only cloud may prejudice depending 
on its scope and implementation. Protection of privacy may also need to be weighed against the 
policy objectives of economic growth and innovation.
38
 Even a single declared objective may in itself 
encompass a spectrum of possibilities – notably, in relation to access by foreign LEAs, preventing 
access altogether lies at one end of the spectrum, but controlled access mediated by authorities of 
the relevant European state seems the more likely objective. 
 
Some policy objectives may be presented as an initial negotiating stance – such as in relation to the 
current trade negotiations between Europe and the US on a proposed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), to pressurise the US to adopt stronger privacy laws,
39
 while refusing to 
include data protection in the trade talks.
40
 
 
It is therefore important, when considering the meaning, scope, implementation and implications of 
“Europe-only cloud”, to bear in mind the key underlying policy objectives, and to address how they 
may be achieved and balanced as appropriate. Despite much publicity regarding the risks of access 
by non-European LEAs and intelligence agencies without going through mutual legal assistance 
channels, the objective of eliminating such access or making it more difficult is not the key focus of 
this paper, and this paper does not suggest that the technical measures to be discussed can 
guarantee to prevent such access. 
 
Before the issues can be discussed in detail, however, it is important to clarify what exactly is meant 
by a “Europe-only cloud”. We will therefore now analyse the key constituent concepts in the following 
order: “cloud”, “Europe” and “only”. 
2. “Cloud” 
“Cloud computing” involves many different types of services, and a one-size-fits-all approach should 
not be taken to the cloud.
41
 When “Europe-only cloud” is discussed, what service model is intended to 
                                                     
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Former European Commissioner Reding: “I warn against bringing data protection to the trade talks. Data 
protection is not red tape or a tariff. It is a fundamental right and as such it is not negotiable… Once a single, 
coherent set of [data protection] rules is in place in Europe, we will expect the same from the US… The on-going 
data protection reform will be the foundation on the European side of a solid data bridge that will link the US and 
Europe. We expect the US to quickly set its side of the bridge. It is better to have steady footing on a bridge than 
to worry about the tide in a 'Safe' or, after all, not so 'Safe' harbour.” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-867_en.htm. For more on TTIP see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/. 
Contrast negotiations on the multinational Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), where a leaked draft of the 
Financial Services Annex Art X.11 evinces the aim of facilitating cross-border transfers of financial information: 
“No Party shall take measures that prevent transfers of information or the processing of financial information, 
including transfers of data by electronic means, into and out of its territory, for data processing or that, subject to 
importation rules consistent with international agreements, prevent transfers of equipment, where such transfers 
of information, processing of financial information or transfers of equipment are necessary for the conduct of the 
ordinary business of a financial service supplier. Nothing in this paragraph restricts the right of a Party to protect 
personal data, personal privacy and the confidentiality of individual records and accounts so long as such right is 
not used to circumvent the provisions of this Agreement.” https://wikileaks.org/tisa-financial/#article_x11. 
40
 E.g. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92a14dd2-44b9-11e3-a751-00144feabdc0.html and 
http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-eu-us-trade-talks/ttip-data-elephant-room-news-530654. 
41
 At its simplest, cloud computing is a way of delivering computing resources as a utility service via a network, 
typically the Internet, scalable up and down according to user requirements. W. K. Hon and C. Millard, “Cloud 
Technologies and Services”, in Cloud Computing Law, C. Millard, Ed., OUP, 2013, chapter 1 pg. 3. See chapters 
1 and 2 of that book for a more detailed explanation. 
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be encompassed: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a 
Service (SaaS),
42
 or all of them? Furthermore, SaaS services may be vastly different from each other, 
varying from webmail, photo sharing and social networking to document processing and customer 
relationship management and more. 
 
Cloud is just one method of delivering and using technology resources, and we suggest that the focus 
should be on regulating what it is used for, not on use of cloud computing per se. There is an 
important distinction between using cloud computing to make available data intended to be public, 
such as for hosting websites or for providing general online access to public databases, and using 
cloud computing to store or otherwise process data to which access is intended to be restricted, such 
as a corporate group's internal customer relationship management data where no one outside the 
group is intended to have access. Cloud services may also be used for mixed purposes, where some 
data are intended to be public, but other data are for restricted access only, such as some SaaS 
storage or social networking services where users may designate certain data or pages public, but 
intend to make others available only to a defined group of users. 
 
For example, one popular use of IaaS/PaaS is for hosting websites, particularly among organisations 
that have used cloud for over 18 months.
43
 Many websites, including websites of European-
incorporated organisations, are hosted using IaaS/PaaS provided by non-European, typically US, 
cloud providers. A blanket prohibition on using non-European IaaS/PaaS would also ban their use for 
hosting websites, which seems to cast the net very wide. Surely any requirements regarding “Europe-
only cloud” ought to take into account the purpose pursued by the underlying policy objective (e.g. to 
prevent unmediated access by US LEAs), rather than simply targeting cloud computing technology as 
such. Passing laws requiring local hosting of websites (and web services), which would also be 
needed in order to ensure Europe-only routing and storage, has been described as “a drastic move 
that has not yet been pushed by German leaders”, but it has been pursued by other nations, such as 
Indonesia
44
 and Russia.
45
 
 
Even if it is possible for Europe to build IaaS / PaaS services that are “Europe-only” throughout the 
whole supply chain, it must be borne in mind that in reality many SaaS services popular with 
Europeans, whether organisations or consumers, are US-based: e.g. Facebook, Yahoo! Mail, 
Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, YouTube and Dropbox, and “if you're using their services, a 
national routing system will not help”.
46
 Again, it is not realistic to ban European users from using such 
services; while any measures would also have severe implications for international trade agreements. 
If Europeans are to be restricted to using Europe-only SaaS, must Europe produce homegrown 
                                                     
42
 See n. 2. 
43
 http://cloudindustryforum.org/downloads/whitepapers/cif-white-paper-8-2012-uk-cloud-adoption-and-2013-
trends.pdf#5 and http://www.rackspace.com/blog/top-10-common-uses-for-the-cloud-for-2012/. 
44
 Regulation No. 82 of 2012 regarding the Implementation of Electronic Systems and Electronic Transactions. 
45
 Federal Law No. 242-FZ dated 21 July 2014 “On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation with regard to Personal Data Processing in Information and Telecommunications Networks.” 
46
 http://www.dw.de/deutsche-telekom-internet-data-made-in-germany-should-stay-in-germany/a-17165891. Also: 
“It would not work when Germans surf on websites hosted on servers abroad, such as social network Facebook 
or search engine Google” (n. 5). Provisioning such services could include use of servers elsewhere in Europe 
rather than in the US (which would again involve extra-national routing), as locations of data centres used are not 
necessarily determined by geographical proximity to customers, “but on factors such as the availability of cheap 
power, cool climates, and high-speed broadband networks” (ibid).  
Certainly, hosting cloud services (whether IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) for European customers in the US would not 
always be sensible as they incur transit and latency costs. Having data centres near European IXPs (IXPs are 
discussed in n. 2) means they can be multihomed cheaply to every European national backbone, which would 
make the BGP configuration easy. But even European-located data centres may be owned/operated by providers 
that are subject to legal compulsion by non-European states, as will be discussed later. (The reference to 
"broadband" seems irrelevant as these issues relate purely to access networks available to customers.) See 
further n. 2. 
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European equivalents of Facebook, Twitter etc (as well as IaaS/PaaS services)?
47
 If so, how can this 
be achieved?
48
 
 
There are also plenty of other ways for non-European persons to collect and access information about 
European persons other than through their use of cloud computing; leading to the question of a 
“Europe-only Internet”, not just “Europe-only cloud”. Many websites, both European and non-
European, and whether hosted using cloud computing or not, are known to collect and track personal 
data of their visitors, often quite detailed. However, the solution cannot be to stop European users 
from visiting such websites altogether. Even when visiting European websites, users may be unable 
to avoid non-European routing of material automatically downloaded to their computers when visiting 
the website, because many European webpages may be hosted on servers located outside Europe,
49
 
and/or may incorporate content and functionality from US providers which will accordingly be routed 
via the US or other non-European infrastructure, e.g. the Facebook Like button, which enables 
Facebook to track users' visits to other websites.
50
 This is but one aspect of a major limitation, to be 
discussed further below, to the “Europe-only cloud” concept, which arises whenever any non-
European service, hardware or related element is included in the service supply chain. 
3. “Europe” 
What is meant by “Europe”, in the context of “Europe-only cloud”? "Europe" could mean the European 
Union (EU - 28 Member States), European Economic Area (31 Member States), the Schengen Area 
(26 Member States) or the Council of Europe (47 Member States).
51
 In addition, if "Europe" means the 
EU, the EU has limited competence,
52
 such that if a Europe-only cloud was argued for on national 
security grounds, it would have to defer to Member States to act, who may not trust each other and 
may differ in their implementations of any measure. Furthermore, if in future any states join or leave 
the Schengen Area or Europe, any technical means used to achieve a Europe-only cloud
53
 would 
require reconfiguration, which could be very complicated. 
 
At first sight what a "Europe-only cloud" involves might seem obvious, but in fact there are several 
possibilities here: 
 
 Use only European cloud providers? 
 Confine physical location of data to Europe? 
 Process data in accordance with European laws? 
 
We will suggest that a key underlying issue is the conflation of physical location with access 
and/or legal jurisdiction. Arguably this conflation is the key source of many of the problems faced 
today regarding the application of “legacy” laws to things digital. Legally, there is also a difference 
between "jurisdiction" and "applicable law". A state may claim that its courts have jurisdiction to hear 
certain issues, and may claim jurisdiction to apply its laws to certain situations, sometimes even with 
extraterritorial effect (and in this paper, when we refer to extraterritorial laws or extraterritoriality, we 
                                                     
47
 E.g. “there are too few homegrown alternatives to U.S. services (though admittedly most Germans use 
German webmail providers)” http://gigaom.com/2013/12/09/outgoing-deutsche-telekom-chief-blasts-eu-and-
german-leaders-over-surveillance-inaction/. 
48
 “The only way to really make this work would be to gradually promote and strengthen Europe’s own technology 
industry, so that internet users there don’t default to U.S. services like they currently do” – Gigaom article (n. 17). 
Perhaps the Commission’s proposals to enable the EU to recognise the potential of big data may help bring this 
about, e.g. plans to improve EU processing infrastructure. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
769_en.htm and http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-455_en.htm. 
49
 N. 5. 
50
 Outgoing DT chief executive René Obermann: “many local services such as media websites are in any case 
plugged into U.S. services such as Facebook and Google, for “social” purposes” (n. 47). 
51
 On Schengen, see n. 3. For a Venn diagram showing differences between EU, EEA, and Council of Europe, 
see http://www.kuan0.com/doc/europe-eea-eu-efta-council-of-europe-venn.html. 
52
 Treaty on European Union, Art. 4(2). 
53
 Routing, key management and certificate authorities etc – see n. 2. 
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mean laws that have an extraterritorial effect).
54
 Courts of a state will not necessarily apply its laws, 
e.g. when hearing a contractual dispute where the parties have validly chosen to apply the laws of 
another state to their contract. Many complex issues are raised by conflicts of laws, in situations 
where multiple states could have jurisdiction or multiple laws could apply – please see further the 
Appendix to this paper. It should also be noted that national laws may differ widely; even where the 
laws are a transposition of European instruments; as amply illustrated in the area of data protection. 
 
There is another point to bear in mind throughout this paper. Under EU data protection law, 
"processing" has a special meaning, and includes passive storage, use, viewing, display, disclosure, 
transmission etc; "processing" is not limited to active operations on data. However, generally in IT the 
term is considered to mean active operations on data, i.e. "compute" as opposed to storage or 
transmission. When we use "processing" or "process" in this paper, it will be in the broadest data 
protection law sense. 
3.1 Only European providers? 
Could a Europe-only cloud entail using the services of European cloud providers only, and no other 
providers? For example, in 2011 the Netherlands government was reportedly going to exclude US 
cloud providers from government IT contracts handling government or citizen data, “taking into 
account the possible consequences of the application of foreign law”.
55
 
 
If only “European cloud providers” should be used, which organisations should (or should not) be 
considered to be “European cloud providers” for this purpose? For example, should it only cover 
organisations incorporated under the laws of a European state? Requiring use only of providers 
incorporated in a European state would need to be reconciled with international trade law obligations. 
A potential analogue for this approach can be found in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, 
which defines the concept of ‘European works’ and requires broadcasters to ensure that the "majority 
proportion" of transmissions is of such works.
56
 In addition, while the Directive is a EU measure, the 
concept of a ‘European Work’ is defined to include the 47 Council of Europe member states, rather 
than only EU member states. From an international trade perspective, such cultural protectionism is 
currently permissible, as are measures designed to protect privacy.
57
 
 
What about European-incorporated organisations that are controlled by non-European parents, e.g. 
European subsidiaries of US technology corporations? Would they be considered to be European 
cloud providers, or not? Would organisations incorporated outside Europe, but which have physical 
operations in Europe, e.g. branch offices, be considered “European” for this purpose?
58
 
 
Furthermore, often multiple organisations are involved in the supply chain for a single service, e.g. 
providers of sub-services and/or of hardware or software used in providing the service. Are 
organisations considered to be “European cloud providers” only if all the sub-providers that they use 
                                                     
54
 "Extraterritorial" jurisdiction in the pure legal sense means where the conduct has no territorial link (e.g. the 
perpetrator/victim or regulated entity/customers is not in the relevant territory), and therefore a territorial link is 
established on some other basis (e.g. the nationality of the perpetrator/victim). This should be distinguished from 
laws that have an extraterritorial "effect", where the conduct does have a traditional territorial link, but the 
regulatee is outside the territory, which is the situation with many of the examples discussed in this paper (e.g. 
US provider, or Brazilian citizens). 
55
 http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/dutch-government-to-ban-u-s-providers-over-patriot-act-concerns/58342 And 
see Kroes: “If European cloud customers cannot trust the United States government, then maybe they won't trust 
US cloud providers either”. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-654_en.htm. 
56
 Directive 2010/13/EU; OJ L 95/1, 15.4.2010, at Arts. 1(n) and 16(1) respectively. 
57
 I.e. the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services, at Art. XIV(c)(ii), states that free trade obligations 
may be subject to exemption for “the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and 
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts”. 
58
 The Court of Justice of the EU in the Google Spain case (ECLI:EU:C:2014:317) ruled that Google Inc., a US 
corporation, was directly subject to EU data protection laws under Art 4. DPD as it had an “establishment” on EU 
territory by virtue of having a Spanish subsidiary. 
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to provide their services are “European providers” only too?
59
 For example, where a SaaS service is 
built on a PaaS or IaaS service, must the PaaS/IaaS provider be European-incorporated also 
(assuming European incorporation as the requirement)? How far down the supply chain is it 
necessary to look, where would it end, e.g. would a European hardware requirement include the 
entire manufacturers’ supply chain, down to allowing chips to be sourced only from European chip 
manufacturers? Must even the operator of the data centre used by the PaaS/IaaS provider (if a 
separate organisation) be European-incorporated? 
 
Considering lower-level infrastructure, consideration must also be given to the transmission layer, 
specifically the status of telecommunications providers. Reportedly the German government will not 
be renewing a contract with Verizon, a US telecommunications provider which provides Internet 
services to some German government departments.
60
 Clearly the concern here is that a state with 
legal jurisdiction over the non-European provider may compel the provider to disclose data to which 
the provider has access through its provision of the service.
61
 Any routing constraints need to be 
implemented at the communications infrastructure level, not at the SaaS, PaaS or even IaaS level, so 
telecommunications providers will have a critical role to play in any Europe-only cloud. 
 
As for suppliers of storage, networking, or indeed computing hardware or software used in the 
provision of the service, it is well known that both software and hardware may have unintended 
vulnerabilities which others may take advantage of in order to access data processed using them. 
They may even have vulnerabilities or “back doors” inserted into them by or at the behest of 
intelligence agencies.
62
 Again, one concern is that a state may be able to do this if it has legal 
jurisdiction over the provider or even just practical access or control over the hardware, software or 
standards concerned.
63
 
 
Requiring all cloud services, hardware and software to be sourced only from European providers, and 
no others, may well be difficult to achieve in practice, given that many technology services, equipment 
and software are operated, supplied or made by non-European organisations, and any such 
                                                     
59
 On difficulties with considering all possible sub-providers and suppliers in the supply chain as “processors” in 
the data protection law context, see W. K. Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “Who is Responsible for Personal Data 
in Clouds?”, in C. Millard, Ed. (n. 41) chapter 8. 
60
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28047877 which reported German Interior Ministry spokesman Tobias 
Plate as saying: "There are indications that Verizon is legally required to provide certain things to the NSA, and 
that's one of the reasons the cooperation with Verizon won't continue". See also end of n. 111 regarding US 
organisation Level 3. 
61
 Although see e.g. Verizon’s views that the US government cannot compel it to produce customer data stored in 
data centres outside the US: http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/thoughts-on-foreign-data-storage-and-the-
patriot-act. 
62
 Cisco’s routers were reportedly intercepted without its knowledge for this purpose - 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/. 
Some routers are made by Chinese providers like Huawei and it has been noted that lack of spying technology in 
those cannot be guaranteed either (n. 19). 
DT’s “clean pipe” service, through which subscribing organisations may access the Internet, uses LANCOM 
routers said to involve “‘no backdoor policy’ and incorporates no hidden ways to access its products” and to be 
“developed and manufactured in Germany and are BSI [the German Federal Office for Information Security] 
certified” – see http://blog.4gon.co.uk/german-network-vendor-lancom-systems-cooperate-on-cyber-security-with-
t-systems/ and http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/deutsche-telekom-test-clean-pipe-135510. 
63
 Reportedly the NSA deliberately introduced weaknesses into a random number generator used in the 2006 
Dual EC DRBG encryption standard http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-
restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/?_r=0. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) has since removed the algorithm from its draft guidancehttp://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/sp800-90-042114.cfm 
and a NIST external advisory board released a report in July 2014 stating, “NIST may seek the advice of the NSA 
on cryptographic matters but it must be in a position to assess it and reject it when warranted... The VCAT 
recommends that NIST senior management reviews the current requirement for interaction with the NSA and 
requests changes where it hinders its ability to independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve 
not only the United States Government but the broader community.” 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/VCAT-Report-on-NIST-Cryptographic-Standards-and-
Guidelines-Process.pdf pg. 7, and see further http://www.nist.gov/director/vcat/cryptographic-standards-
guidelines-process.cfm. 
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requirement could also have public procurement law and trade law implications. Furthermore, this 
would not guarantee that there can be no access from outside Europe to data handled, as even 
European-produced services, hardware or software may contain unintended vulnerabilities, allowing 
access by hackers (who may indeed be LEAs) whether from inside or outside Europe; and also, 
European authorities may choose to communicate European data to foreign authorities.
64
 The policy 
document Establishing a Trusted Cloud for Europe,
65
 by the European Commission’s European Cloud 
Partnership Steering Board, expressed a clear view on this issue:
66
 
 
It is clear that the economic potential of European cloud services depends on the ability to 
avoid any semblance of a “Fortress Europe” model where access to the European cloud 
market is de facto restricted to providers established in the EU. Non-European cloud 
providers should be able to access the European cloud market on equal terms, and offer 
services that adhere to the best practices proposed as a part of the Trust [sic] Cloud Europe 
framework, i.e. functional requirements in relation to data type, data usage and enforceability 
of European laws and fundamental principles. 
 
This illustrates that the Commission consider the most important issue to be, not the nationality of 
cloud providers, but whether providers handle data in accordance with requirements of European 
laws and principles, and that such requirements should be enforceable against them.
67
 In other 
words, this suggests their view is that European cloud users should use cloud providers who comply 
with European laws, whether because they are legally subject to European jurisdiction, or (it seems) 
because they voluntarily choose to comply with European laws in relation to their data processing. 
 
One way may be through adherence to the proposed Code of Conduct for Cloud Service Providers 
prepared by the Commission in association with various stakeholders in the Cloud Select Industry 
Group (C-SIG), whose draft is being discussed with European data protection regulators (Article 29 
Working Party).
68
 An international standard on data protection and security in the cloud in relation to 
cloud providers has also been issued,
69
 although regulators' views on its acceptability under 
European laws are unknown. 
3.2 European physical location?70 
Another possibility is that “Europe-only cloud” simply means that cloud-processed data must be 
physically located in Europe. This would be consistent with a common approach to “legacy” laws (or 
their interpretation), which focuses mainly, even exclusively, on the physical location of data. Notably, 
the DPD restricts the “transfer” of personal data outside the EEA, absent “adequate protection” or 
exceptions or derogations permitted by the DPD. “Transfer” was undefined but, notwithstanding the 
                                                     
64
 See e.g. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-looks-at-keeping-its-internet-e-mail-traffic-
inside-its-borders/2013/10/31/981104fe-424f-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html: “The NSA can reach 
information even if it is contained exclusively within Germany, said one former U.S. intelligence official”, 
http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/ on German intelligence agencies sharing data with the 
NSA, http://www.zdnet.com/dutch-government-can-use-spy-data-gathered-illegally-court-rules-7000031970/ on 
Dutch agencies sharing Dutch phone data with the NSA, and http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-
cables-secret-world-communications-nsa on GCHQ, the UK intelligence agency, tapping transatlantic fibre-optic 
cables landing on British shores carrying data to western Europe from north America, and sharing information 
with the NSA. 
65
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=4935. 
66
 60% of respondents to the Trusted Cloud Europe survey agreed with the first sentence, nearly 75% with the 
second – n. 83 pgs. 7-8. 
67
 It is unclear whether this refers to theoretical or practical enforcement. A state could theoretically extend its 
laws to cover, and claim legal jurisdiction over, persons outside its borders. But if those persons have no tangible 
connection with that state (e.g. incorporation, people, or assets there), it may have difficulty enforcing against 
those persons in practice. See further paragraph containing n. 139. 
68
 See http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441182. 
69
 ISO/IEC 27018:2014 - Information technology - Security techniques - Code of practice for protection of 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors. 
70
 For more detailed explication see http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed35439. 
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European Court of Justice's decision in Lindqvist,
71
 has generally been interpreted by data protection 
authorities (DPAs) as involving the physical location of personal data “moving” to outside the 
European Economic Area (EEA),
72
 whether by transmission of data to a “third country” outside the 
EEA, remote access to such data from a third country, or physical transportation to a third country of 
hardware storing such data. The widespread assumption that physical data location is the most 
important factor has led to much research being conducted to devise methods to constrain and/or 
track the physical location of data, e.g. IBM's patent on controlling data location.
73
 
 
Usually, location is taken to mean the geographical location of the data centres holding the servers or 
other equipment in which data are stored or operated upon. However, the “location” of cloud providers 
is also often mentioned.
74
 But what does that “location” mean: the states of incorporation of such 
providers; the states where they have places of business or operations (which could be different from 
the state of incorporation, and indeed may be multiple for providers who have operations in several 
states); or indeed all of them? 
 
If it’s necessary to consider the “locations” of cloud sub-providers also (whether that be the locations 
their data centres and/or states of incorporation/operations), then the issue discussed above also 
arises here - how far down the supply chain must one look? Who must be considered a sub-provider 
for this purpose: data centre owners/operators, connectivity providers, hardware/software suppliers? 
And again, what locations must be considered there – their physical places of business/operations, 
states of incorporation? 
 
Multiple physical locations may be involved in the provision of just one cloud service from a single 
provider – locations of data centres used not just for persistent storage, but also for active processing 
operations, for backups or to improve service availability and performance, e.g. caches, content 
delivery networks / edge locations, or for storage of and operations on indexes of stored data and 
other metadata. Indeed, the physical location of fibre-optic cables used to transmit data between data 
centres, and between data centre and customer (or cloud provider staff) may also be relevant
75
 As we 
now know, intelligence agencies have intercepted communications through access to physical 
locations through which cables pass, whether in the USA
76
 or outside. 
 
This highlights one reason for the fixation on physical location: there appears to be an implicit 
assumption that physical location will enable intelligible data to be accessed by whoever has access 
to that physical location, and by states which can compel those persons to access and disclose data 
to them. However, physical (or even remote) access to storage, computing or communications 
hardware does not necessarily afford access to intelligible data. This is because the provisioning of 
cloud services does not necessarily entail that all parts of a particular dataset will physically co-reside 
in the same hardware or even hardware infrastructure (e.g. data centre). Further, data, whether in 
persistent storage or in transmission, may be encrypted and/or subject to other protection 
mechanisms to control who may have access to intelligible data.
77
 These mechanisms can work to 
defeat or hinder access to intelligible data regardless of physical data location. Encrypted data would 
be intelligible to anyone with access to the data and the relevant decryption keys, but should be 
                                                     
71
 ECLI:EU:C:2003:596. The court in Lindqvist decided that uploading personal data to the servers of an EU-
incorporated web hosting provider is not a "transfer". It declined to rule on the issue of data location or whether 
the uploader or provider effected any "transfer" on personal data actually being accessed by a website visitor. 
72
 The EEA is the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. References to "EU" in the DPD context can be 
taken to include "EEA" as the DPD's application extends to the broader EEA. 
73
 http://www-03.ibm.com/press/uk/en/pressrelease/44563.wss - although see prior work such as 
http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=67419. See also n. 2. 
74
 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing (WP196)’ 29 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf. 
75
 From a DPD perspective, mere transit, i.e. using cables sited in the EU for routing data which do not end up in 
the EU, does not subject sender or recipient to EU data protection laws for that reason alone: Art 4(1)(c). 
76
 E.g. Google and Yahoo’s main bridges to the Internet - http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-
say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
77
 See n. 2. 
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unintelligible to others. EEA data protection authorities consider that "encrypted data" remain 
"personal data",
78
 whereas we argue that encrypted data should be "personal data" only in relation to 
those who can access the decryption key (but not those who cannot).
79
 
 
Communications links may also be encrypted, as Google hastened to do for links between its internal 
data centres soon after the relevant NSA revelations.
80
 Encrypted links using Transport Layer 
Security (TLS), e.g. https connections in web browsers, is increasingly recommended – and perhaps 
becoming the norm, so that unauthorised eavesdropping on transmissions may become less of a 
problem. However, that assumes a robust encryption regime, and uncompromised and trustworthy 
key certificate authorities. Thus, again the physical location of providers may be important – in this 
case, whether providers of the relevant certificates (certificate authorities) are European-based or, for 
example, US-based. 
 
Furthermore, data physically stored in Europe may be accessed remotely. As such, a focus on 
“location” could involve multiple locations here too – e.g., the state where the person who accessed 
data was physically located at the time of the access; even the state of which that person is a citizen 
or resident or (if the access is attributable to an organisation) in which the organisation was 
incorporated. Indeed, actual remote access to personal data physically stored in Europe, by someone 
then physically located outside Europe, is in practice generally treated by many practitioners and 
DPAs as a regulated “transfer” of that data to a location outside Europe for DPD purposes. Such 
remote access could be by an authorised person, but it could also be unlawful, e.g. criminal hacking. 
But whether data physically stored in Europe (or outside) is protected against hacking or other 
unauthorised access depends on the security measures deployed, not on the physical location of the 
data. Physical location of data in Europe does not protect it against unauthorised access. In terms of 
controlling access to data, security measures such as access control and encryption, including control 
of keys
81
 are more important than physical location to restrict access to persons or to an extent not 
authorised by the cloud customer. Physical location is relevant to security, but only as one element, 
rather than as an end in itself.
82
 Thus, 93% of respondents to the Trusted Cloud for Europe survey 
supported the idea of encouraging “information security that is balanced with consumer and provider 
needs”, while 68% supported review and identification of formal requirements (e.g. data location) and 
underlying functional requirements (e.g. security and accessibility) that could serve as acceptable 
substitutes.
83
 
 
To recap, physical location of data in Europe is not always necessary or sufficient for ensuring that 
the data will be protected and handled in accordance with European laws.
84
 We argue that the 
continuing narrow focus on physical data location obscures the underlying issue: namely, access to 
intelligible data, and the importance of security measures in that regard. Furthermore, this focus is not 
necessarily consistent with a decision of the EU Court of Justice, which emphasised jurisdiction over 
physical location.
85
 Indeed, regarding national data location restrictions, the Trusted Cloud Europe 
policy document stated:
86
 
 
If common requirements can be found for similar use cases, Member States can choose to 
gradually phase out data location restrictions when they are deemed unnecessary. This does 
not imply that data controls should be abandoned; it is often possible and advisable to replace 
                                                     
78
 N. 74. 
79
 See W. K. Hon, C. Millard and I. Walden, “What is Regulated as Personal Data in Clouds?” in C. Millard (Ed.), 
Cloud Computing Law (OUP, 2013), chapter 7. 
80
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-encrypts-data-amid-backlash-against-nsa-
spying/2013/09/06/9acc3c20-1722-11e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8ef_story.html. 
81
 Covered in more detail elsewhere - see n. 2. 
82
 W. K. Hon and C. Millard, “How Do Restrictions on International Data Transfers Work in Clouds?”, in C. Millard, 
Ed., chapter 10, and n. 70. 
83
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=6608 pgs. 4-5. 
84
 N. 82 and n. 70. 
85
 Lindqvist (ECLI:EU:C:2003:596) and n. 70. 
86
 N. 65, pg. 19. 
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formal legal requirements (such as geographic location of the data) by the corresponding 
functional requirements (such as ensuring the accessibility and security of the data). State-of-
the art security technologies could be regarded for some use cases as an alternative to data 
location restrictions. This goal oriented approach is technologically neutral, conducive to 
supporting innovation and new technologies, and enables public policy objectives to be more 
effectively reached. 
 
Brazil decided to drop a requirement proposed in autumn 2013, after the Snowden revelations, to 
store all information regarding Brazilian citizens locally, only in servers physically located in Brazil, i.e. 
to ‘oblige internet service companies […] to install and use centres for the storage, management and 
dissemination of data within the national territory’.
87
 The “forced data localisation” proposal was 
criticised on the basis that requiring providers to build/use data centres/servers in Brazil would 
increase costs significantly for users, “scare Internet companies away”, not guarantee protection 
against nefarious actors to whom location of Internet-connected computers is irrelevant and who may 
intercept data if routed over the Internet, and make surveillance of Brazilian citizens easier for Brazil’s 
police and intelligence services.
88
 When passed in April 2014
89
 the law (commonly known as Marco 
Civil da Internet, and now in effect) instead applied Brazilian law extraterritorially, extending Brazilian 
jurisdiction, including requirements to meet LEA requests, even to non-Brazilian organisations in 
relation to information on Brazilian citizens, wherever stored.
90
 Extending the territorial reach of 
national laws has been a strong trend over recent years.
91
 The UK recently passed The Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA),
92
 under which non-UK service providers 
holding communications data of UK citizens, particularly webmail providers, could be forced to retain 
and disclose their data (s 4). 
 
Russia’s new law,
93
 amending its personal data protection law,
94
 requires that “while collecting 
personal data, including by means of the internet, an operator should provide recording, 
systematization, storage and update of the Russian citizen’s personal data using databases located in 
the territory of the Russian Federation”,
95
 with certain exceptions e.g. “personal data processing for 
the purpose of implementation of an international agreement or related Russian law”.
96
 The locations 
of servers hosting such databases must be notified to Roskomnadzor (the Federal Supervision 
                                                     
87
 http://dataguidance.com/news.asp?id=2129. 
88
 See e.g. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/t-a-ridout/brazils-push-to-govern-the-internet_b_4133811.html - and 
see also n. 17. 
89
 http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL_03/_Ato2011-2014/2014/Lei/L12965.htm. 
90
 More specifically, any data processing operation involving logs, personal data or communication where at least 
one processing activity (for example, collection or storage) occurs in Brazilian territory will be subject to Brazilian 
rules on privacy, data protection and secrecy of private communications and logs. This will be the case when at 
least one of the devices connected to the Internet is located in Brazilian territory (even if the organisation carrying 
out the data processing activities is located outside), provided the activity offers a service to the Brazilian market 
or at least one member within its economic group has an establishment in Brazil. Monica Salgado, ‘New Data 
Protection Law in Brazil’ [2014] Privacy & Data Protection 13. 
91
 See I. Walden, "Law Enforcement Access to Data in Clouds" in Cloud Computing Law, C. Millard, Ed., OUP, 
2013, chapter 11 pg. 285. 
92
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/contents/enacted/data.htm. 
93
 No. 553424-6 http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=553424-6. 
94
 Initially this law, signed by Russia's President Putin on 21 July 2014 (previous note), was to take effect on 1 
September 2016. However, reportedly an amendment bill submitted to the State Duma, the lower house of 
Russia's Parliament, on 1 September 2014, cited 1 January 2015 as the effective date e.g. 
http://www.bna.com/russia-seeks-new-n17179894570/. It has also been reported that the State Duma approved 
the draft amendments on 24 September 2014 in a second reading, but a third reading, signing by the President 
and official publication is necessary before they can take effect. http://www.globallawwatch.com/2014/09/russias-
new-law-establishing-localization-requirement-for-processing-of-personal-data/. 
95
 http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/739029. 
96
 http://www.privacylaws.com/Publications/enews/International-E-news/Dates/2014/7/Russias-Internet-Privacy-
Act-will-have-wide-implications-for-foreign-companies/. 
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Agency for Information Technologies and Communications).
97
 Furthermore, non-compliant services 
may be added to a “blacklist” register of domain names, network addresses and webpage indexes
98
 
maintained by Roskomnadzor, and Russian authorities are empowered to require restriction of public 
Internet access to such services.
99
 Effectively, the law will prohibit non-Russian cloud and other 
Internet service providers (including search engines, social networks, mobile app providers and web 
hosts) from providing online services that involve processing personal data of Russian citizens, 
including email addresses and emails, unless they create databases of such data on Russian-located 
servers,
100
 which would entail establishing data centres in Russia or using Russian data centres, with 
associated costs implications and tight timing even for Russian providers.
101
 Practical compliance may 
also be unclear regarding Russian citizens living outside Russia,
102
 and how providers can verify the 
nationality of data subjects and whether the law will apply to them if data on nationality is not 
available.
103
 More generally, Russia's Association of Electronic Communication (RAEC), a lobbying 
group for Internet organisations, warned that “many global internet services would be impossible”
104
 
and Russian search engine Yandex reportedly considers the law “…another step towards the 
strengthening of state control over the Internet in Russia, which has a negative impact on the 
development [sic] industry”.
105
 
 
Whether this law would achieve its goals depends on the true nature of those goals, which seem 
unclear.
106
 It has been suggested this move seems designed more to facilitate Russia’s own access 
to its citizens’ data for the benefit of its intelligence and law enforcement agencies,
107
 whereas 
currently Russia would need to submit mutual legal assistance requests to obtain data from other 
states.
108
 Even so, encryption of such data may prevent, hinder or delay such access, although 
Russian government authorities may well have the resources to decrypt specifically-targeted data. An 
avowed objective of Russia’s new law is to prevent or at least impede digital access to such data by 
persons outside Russia, particularly non-Russian intelligence agencies.
109
 However, this could be 
defeated relatively easily because remote access to such data from outside Russia is technically 
possible over the Internet, and providers (Russian or non-Russian) subject to another jurisdiction’s 
laws may be compelled to retrieve such data e.g. by warrant.
110
 Even data stored in Russia, if 
                                                     
97
 N. 93 and http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-government-will-force-companies-store-citizen-data-
locally-148560. 
98
 It is unclear how webpage indexes would be registered. 
99
 Nn. 95, 96. 
100
 Nn. 95, 96. 
101
 Popular Russian search engine Yandex is reportedly already using Russian servers, but added that “building 
data centres required by law from scratch would take more than the two years allocated” 
http://www.techrez.com/2014/07/russia-internet-restrictions.html. Other Internet organisations also consider 2 
years is insufficient to find or build Russian data centres (n. 94). 
102
 E.g. http://tech.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=5365111&cid=47387219. 
103
 
http://www.alrud.com/upload/iblock/3ea/Newsletter_Ban%20to%20store%20personal%20data%20outside%20Ru
ssia.pdf. 
104
 E.g. http://news.yahoo.com/russian-lawmakers-pass-bill-restricting-internet-172456389.html. 
105
 http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/facebook-gmail-skype-face-russia-ban-under-anti-terror-plan/. 
106
 E.g. http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/02/russia-moves-to-ban-online-services-that-dont-store-personal-data-in-
russia/. 
107
 E.g. http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/07/04/russias-latest-internet-law-proposal-anti-nsa-or-pro-fsb/, and 
n. 105. And on German-only email routing, see n. 14: “So you would [in effect] have a national surveillance of the 
internet… That also applies if only the email communication, not the total internet traffic, stays in Germany. It 
might avoid foreign intelligence services reading it but it would allow the German intelligence services easy 
access”. 
108
 See n. 91. 
109
 MP Vadim Dengin reportedly stated, while introducing the bill to Russia parliament, that organisations should 
build data centres in Russia: “Most Russians don’t want their data to leave Russia for the United States, where it 
can be hacked and given to criminals. Our entire lives are stored over there” (n. 101). Another possible 
motivation could be to encourage development of Russian online services. 
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uploaded, downloaded, or otherwise transmitted over the Internet, may be intercepted by persons 
from other states. Which brings us back to the wider Internet physical routing issue. 
 
A fair question to ask is, to what extent are European Internet communications actually routed through 
the USA or otherwise outside Europe, currently? A 2001 report for the European Parliament noted, 
regarding cable communications, that: 
 
At the time of the science backbone, the switches for the routing of global Internet 
communications were situated in the USA. For that reason, at that time intelligence services 
could intercept a substantial proportion of European Internet communications. Today, only a 
small proportion of intra-European Internet communications are routed via the USA. A small 
proportion of intra-European communications are routed via a switch in London to which, 
since foreign communications are involved, the British monitoring station GCHQ has access. 
The majority of communications do not leave the continent: for example, more than 95% of 
intra-German Internet communications are routed via a switch in Frankfurt.”
111
 
 
Mechanisms to restrict physical location of data and/or routing may be feasible technically.
112
 Indeed, 
some providers already process, or offer the choice of processing, customer data in data centres 
located geographically close to users, to reduce latency – often for performance and availability rather 
than legal reasons.
113
 However, for national or Schengen routing of data, as well as addressing 
various technical issues,
114
 the involvement of multiple Internet providers would be needed, whether 
                                                                                                                                                                     
110
 A New York magistrate judge’s warrant against Microsoft for email data stored in Ireland has been much 
publicised and Microsoft’s appeal was supported by Apple, Cisco and Verizon. See e.g. http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-
uk/news/2350252/apple-and-cisco-lend-support-to-microsoft-in-cloud-data-access-debate Microsoft lost the 
appeal, and is being given time to appeal further, which it is doing. http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/31/microsoft-
loses-email-privacy-case-with-u-s-gov-will-appeal/ and http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2014/07/31/microsoft-responds-ruling-warrant-case/. 
However, it is not only the USA where government authorities ask foreign providers for data stored abroad, e.g. 
Brazilian court orders against Google in 2006 for data (including IP addresses, names and email addresses) 
stored on US servers relating to users of Google’s social network Orkut. http://www.informationweek.com/google-
wrestles-with-brazils-requests-for-user-data-on-american-servers/d/d-id/1046450 and 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090100608.html. 
111
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A5-2001-
0264&format=XML&language=EN [3.3.1.1]. According to a board member of the non-profit organization that runs 
the DE-CIX Internet exchange point in Frankfurt, in a report regarding DT’s proposal, “More than 90 percent of 
Germany's internet traffic already stays within its borders” (n. 5). This percentage was confirmed by DT’s head of 
security - http://www.dw.de/no-welcome-for-deutsche-telekom-national-internet-plans-from-eu-commission/a-
17219111 - but another source stated that “only around 40 percent of German Internet traffic is conducted 
between domestic computers [apparently meaning, servers owned by German organisations?]… But some 
Internet service providers also use American providers, such as Level 3 Communications, for data transfer. That 
means that even if the actual bits never leave Germany's borders, the NSA could (potentially) still access them, 
although the company vehemently denies this.” (n. 19). The ultimate source of these figures is unclear, and they 
may be difficult to verify, especially as much traffic is HTTPS and cached nationally. 
112
 E.g. NIST’s proof of concept on “trusted geolocation for deploying and migrating cloud workloads between 
cloud servers within a cloud” http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/ir7904/draft_nistir_7904.pdf. 
113
 E.g. Heroku http://gigaom.com/2013/04/25/heroku-comes-to-europe-but-data-protection-issues-remain/. Other 
providers do allow customers to choose European data centre locations for regulatory reasons, e.g. Microsoft  
and recently Amazon https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2014/10/23/announcing-the-aws-eu-
frankfurt-region/. 
114
 E.g. “It would need its own root DNS servers and its own designs for address allocation as well as a protocol 
to hand off traffic to the Internet at large… government funding and the network would require maintenance and - 
possibly – monitoring in the form of deep packet inspection just to ensure network efficiency”. 
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/79286.html. 
However, see n. 14. It is not difficult to run DNS servers. All ISPs already conduct deep packet inspection as they 
need to do so for traffic engineering their own internal server/client traffic. Most European ISPs have local-only 
CDNs (e.g. Telefonica and BT have such CDNs for IPTV services). Further, DNS inherently supports delegation, 
enabling a decentralised namespace, and IP address allocations are also delegated, so "own designs to address 
allocation" and "protocol to hand off traffic" would seem not be difficult, or even necessary. 
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through voluntary cooperation or legal compulsion.
115
 Geographical routing may also be specifically 
designed to circumvent legal controls. For example, US authorities apparently deliberately routed 
traffic between US citizens outside the USA in order to get round US laws that forbid interception 
otherwise.
116
 The UK considers that its security services are entitled to monitor searches on US cloud 
services Google, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, as well as supposedly private messages on social 
media among UK citizens, and emails to or from non-British citizens abroad, on the basis that they 
are deemed to involve “external” communications.
117
 
 
There are also limitations with trying to constrain physical location or routing, as mentioned above 
regarding emails sent to recipients in another state, or where services or hardware/software used are 
controlled by providers (including certificate authorities) who are subject to foreign jurisdictions,
118
 who 
may be legally compelled to access and disclose data: “The point of a German-only Internet becomes 
moot… the moment a customer uses services, such as Google, that transfer their data traffic using 
foreign infrastructure and thereby renders it subject to the laws of those states.”
119
 Indeed, a DT 
representative acknowledged that “If users access services outside of this national - or Schengen - 
routing system (we propose expanding the system to the Schengen Area), then it won't work. The 
data will have to be exchanged with that in the United States, and then American regulations apply”, 
and also, “in order to access your data while abroad, you will have to go over foreign networks”.
120
 
 
Furthermore, the argument that confining physical location and routing of data to Europe would 
prevent foreign LEAs from gaining access to European data lacks substance,
121
 because they may 
such gain access from European authorities, who can access such data (as national laws allow for 
national security and/or law enforcement purposes, to varying extents), and may choose to pass such 
data on to foreign authorities.
122
 No one has ever suggested that foreign LEAs should never obtain 
access to European data, simply that to do so they should go through mutual legal assistance 
procedures under relevant treaties e.g. the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001). 
 
National or Schengen routing proposals have encountered considerable scepticism, with Pirate Party 
MEP Amelia Andersdotter terming Friedrich’s proposal “trumped-up lip service… and it's ineffective, 
and it's hypocritical”, pointing out that it is the overall Internet “infrastructure that creates insecurity… 
The spying we've seen is an egregious violation of human rights. Why should we believe that the 
limitation of internet traffic to Germany and Europe means the problem is solved?”. An expert from 
Europe’s largest hacker association, German-based Chaos Computer Club, has noted that while the 
“infrastructure needed to create an inner European network exists”, “[b]y 'ensuring' citizens that they 
are only safe if they restrict their internet usage to within Europe, what is the Internet there for?”
123
 
                                                     
115
 N. 19. “Deutsche Telekom could also have trouble getting rival broadband groups on board because they are 
wary of sharing network information”, and “Others pointed out that Deutsche Telekom's preference for being paid 
by other Internet networks for carrying traffic to the end user, instead of "peering" agreements at no cost, clashed 
with the goal to keep traffic within Germany. It can be cheaper or free for German traffic to go through London or 
Amsterdam, where it can be intercepted by foreign spies” (n. 5). 
Whether this is the case depends on specific arrangements. Generally, the aim is traffic localisation to reduce 
latency and transit costs, e.g. there is often a tight coupling between major infrastructure and service providers 
(see n. 2). 
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 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2460462. 
117
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/17/mass-surveillance-social-media-permitted-uk-law-charles-farr 
and http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/18/government-surveillance-watchdog-loopholes. 
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 Such as foreign social networking services, even European websites that incorporate scripts or plugins or 
other functionality from foreign services - see §2. 
119
 N. 19. 
120
 N. 46. 
121
 As stated by a DT spokesman regarding national routing: “Secret services of states outside this area would 
then find it much more difficult to access this data traffic” (Gigaom article n. 17). Note that he did not say 
“impossible” – see also Washington Post article n 64 : “Routing German Internet traffic within Germany “makes it 
a little more difficult for the NSA to look into our data... But… The solution is not really technical. The solution is a 
political one”. 
122
 N. 64. 
123
 N. 11. 
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Similarly, “The initiative runs counter to how the Internet works today - global traffic is passed from 
network to network under free or paid-for agreements with no thought for national borders…. It is 
internationally without precedent that the internet traffic of a developed country bypasses the servers 
of another country”.
124
 Even DT’s outgoing chief executive has acknowledged that “proposing a 
‘German internet’ would be like asking for a “German sun.”
125
 
 
Others have expressed concerns about economic as well as openness implications: “If more states 
wall themselves off, it could lead to a troubling ‘Balkanisation’ of the Internet, crippling the openness 
and efficiency that have made the web a source of economic growth”,
126
 and “you can create 
regulations that block off trade in these information services… [but] There will be massive sacrifices of 
economic efficiency”.
127
 Human rights law is also relevant. It looms largest in this context in relation to 
privacy and data protection under the DPD and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
128
 but rights to 
freedom of expression and information, and indeed even to liberty and security, freedom of thought, of 
the arts and sciences, to education and to work, could be affected depending on how a Europe-only 
cloud might constrain access by European citizens to non-European data or services. 
 
Significantly, former Commissioner Kroes (responsible for the Digital Agenda) reportedly was not 
positive about the concept of a German Internet, stating in similar vein that “Telcos are too important 
to have only a ringfenced fragmented approach.
129
 We can't afford to have 28 member states just 
ringfenced… We have to compete with global partners and we have to take into account that our cost 
level can be reduced and that that [sic] at the end of the day is beneficial for the citizens”,
130
 She also 
stated, “The global market cannot be conquered when data is caged within national boundaries and 
their legal framework”,
131
 and “if cloud services are denied scale, they become more expensive. For 
example, if individual states work disjointedly on separate national clouds, then the potential is lost.”
132
 
However, she also seemed to cautiously welcome some aspects of the Europe-only cloud initiative: 
“We support Chancellor Merkel’s calls for better networks, and better data protection and security on 
those networks, as part of a broader digital industrial policy... “We hope that that Franco-German 
discussion on Wednesday, and the discussion with leading industrialists, will lead to an acceleration 
of work on important European legislation in this domain”.
133
 
3.3 Process under European laws? 
A third possible interpretation of a “Europe-only cloud” is that any processing of “European data” 
using cloud computing should take place in compliance with European laws and principles,
134
 
regardless of the physical locations of data,
135
 or the providers’ or sub-providers’ places of 
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 N. 5. 
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 N. 47. 
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 N. 5 and http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/06/tim-berners-lee-reclaim-the-web. 
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 http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/10/16/232181204/are-we-moving-to-a-world-with-more-online-
surveillance. 
128
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/. 
129
 Ironically, this is exactly what EU telecoms law currently does, because Member States have not accepted the 
“country of origin” principle, whereby a provider is to be regulated by a single Member State, that from which it 
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 http://www.dw.de/no-welcome-for-deutsche-telekom-national-internet-plans-from-eu-commission/a-17219111. 
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 N. 14. 
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 N. 55 (Kroes). 
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 Germany’s Chancellor Merkel has said US internet companies must abide by German laws and tell officials 
what they are doing with citizens' data. "Germany will make clear that we want internet firms to tell us in Europe 
who they are giving data to”. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-07/15/angela-merkel-prism. 
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 Illustrating difficulties with understanding what laws require in relation to physical data location, in a case 
striking down the EU Data Retention Directive as contrary to fundamental rights due to its wide scope and lack of 
provision for appropriate safeguards, the Court of Justice of the EU stated (para 68): 
“it should be added that that directive does not require the data in question to be retained within the 
European Union, with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3) 
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incorporation or operations. This seems to us to be the most technologically-neutral way to address 
the fundamental underlying concern, and here we use “European data” simply to mean data that 
Europe decides should be subject to European laws; although this is another concept that requires 
detailed analysis and consideration by policymakers, particularly which data (e.g. European citizens) 
and in what circumstances.
136
 
 
A major concern that states have regarding data is that processing of “their data” (which we use 
analogously to “European data”) should be subject to their own laws and jurisdiction. Some states 
apply their laws based on physical location in their territory of data, or at least of equipment used to 
process data; for example one jurisdictional ground under Art 4 of the DPD is based on equipment 
location. One priority motivating Brazil’s desire to require local storage of data was “so that it could be 
subject to Brazilian laws”,
137
 illustrating the conflation of physical location with jurisdiction to enforce a 
country's laws effectively. Unsurprisingly, that approach is rooted in the pre-digital world, where states 
can have effective jurisdiction over persons or physical objects located on their territories. That 
approach may make sense with things physical, but not with digital data, which are relatively easy to 
duplicate and copy/move between physical locations, and where multiple copies of the same data 
may exist in different locations. Indeed, recognition of this reality drove changes to the DPD’s 
jurisdictional basis, from data location in the original 1990 draft, to equipment location in the 1992 
amended proposal.
138
 No doubt the relative ease of exercising jurisdiction over equipment physically 
located in one’s territory and the relative stability of equipment’s physical location, compared with 
more “movable” digital data, was a factor. Brazil achieved its own jurisdictional aim, even after 
dropping the local data storage requirement, by extending its laws to apply with extraterritorial effect 
instead. So, in terms of jurisdiction, states can attempt to apply their laws territorially or 
extraterritorially, but even territorial jurisdiction may have extraterritorial effects. Art 4 DPD provides 
for global application of EU national data protection laws, theoretically, in two distinct ways. Firstly, it 
regulates processing of personal data worldwide by an entity established in an EEA Member State to 
the extent that such processing is “in the context of the activities” of that EEA establishment. 
Secondly, it applies national laws to entities who use “equipment” in EEA territory to process personal 
data, such as operators of non-EEA websites who set, read or modify cookies on visitors’ computers 
or mobiles located in the EEA (being “equipment”). As for practical enforceability, Google Spain
139
 is 
again relevant. Here, the EU Court of Justice found that US-based Google Inc’s activities in relation to 
Google Search were regulated under Spanish law because those activities were “inextricably linked” 
to the sales activities of Google’s Spanish subsidiary.
140
 
 
If a state has effective
141
 jurisdiction over a person who controls such access (regardless of the data’s 
physical location), then it has the ability, in practice if not always in accordance with its international 
law or treaty obligations, to regulate how such data are processed, including use and/or disclosure. 
This practical ability implicitly underlies and enables requests by a state’s authorities, made to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and 
security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully ensured. Such a control, carried out on 
the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data”. 
This unclear passage has seen different interpretations, e.g. that such data cannot be retained outside the EU 
because (in the court’s view) it could not be controlled by an independent authority in that situation, or that (our 
preferred interpretation) such data can be retained outside the EU provided that it is subject to such independent 
supervision, which could be by a non-EU authority such as the US Federal Trade Commission. 
136
 The draft Data Protection Regulation refers to personal data of “residents” of Member States or data subjects 
“residing” in the EU, which concept is undefined and may be problematic – see e.g. Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘A 
“Layered Approach” to the Extraterritoriality of Data Privacy Laws’ (2013) 3 International Data Privacy Law 278, 
279. 
137
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-brazil-internet-idUSBREA2I03O20140319. 
138
 N. 70, text to fn 7-8. 
139
 N. 58. 
140
 N. 58, paras. 55-56. 
141
 Whether jurisdiction claimed by a state is effectively enforceable in practice is a different issue, particularly 
when it attempts to apply its laws extraterritorially (n. 70, text to fn 35). Extraterritoriality is discussed further 
below. 
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persons incorporated or doing business in that state (or otherwise under its jurisdiction), for data 
physically located elsewhere but to which the person has intelligible access.
142
 It certainly underlies 
ongoing concerns that US authorities may obtain European personal data through US cloud providers 
or sub-providers, but again those assume that such providers will necessarily have access to 
intelligible data, which may not always be the case, e.g. such access could be excluded by customers 
encrypting data securely before upload to the cloud (and managing the keys securely, including 
ensuring providers do not have access to the keys).
143
 
 
All this suggests a different possible approach. The Commission's communication on cloud computing 
in 2012 seems to have envisaged this interpretation of "Europe", with "European needs" meaning "in 
accordance with EEA laws".
144
 Accordingly, it may be possible to seek to apply European laws to 
certain data that are not intended to be public, but where access is intended to be available e.g. only 
to employees of a particular organisation or group, not by constraining the data’s physical location to 
European territory, but by requiring that only those who are subject to European jurisdiction may have 
access to that data, especially in intelligible form. Although commercial motivations may have 
hindered their adoption in practice,
145
 such access restrictions to enforce a kind of "virtual jurisdiction" 
may be implemented through technical measures. This approach seems the most promising, in our 
view, as regards cloud data intended for restricted access. For data intended to be public, e.g. 
published on a website, which is one of the possible uses of cloud computing, obviously such an 
approach is not relevant or feasible: the discussion here centres only on technical measures to 
enforce "virtual jurisdiction" regardless of physical location, in relation to cloud data intended for 
limited access, which is the case for many organisations' uses of cloud computing. 
 
As such, the use of Information Flow Control (IFC) techniques may enable data and context-specific 
requirements to control data access and continuously control data flows according to application-level 
policy. In outline, data could potentially be tagged to indicate not only ownership but also type (e.g. 
medical, company, personal), state (encrypted, anonymised, user-input), location and jurisdiction, 
upon which information management policy (at a technical-level) can be based. IFC for cloud 
computing is on-going research: we are designing, developing and implementing a prototype to 
explore this.
146
 In addition, encryption is also highly relevant as it renders information unintelligible for 
all those without the requisite keys. This, again, emphasises the importance of information security. 
Implementing appropriate security measures can, depending on the particular technology, help to 
protect against access to intelligible data by unauthorised persons, whether hacking by cybercriminals 
or lawful (or unlawful) direct access by foreign authorities. 
 
The latter risk may be mitigated by implementing technical security measures to restrict access to 
intelligible data to authorised persons, which may include access controls, limiting the rights of 
authorised persons to the minimum they need for their jobs, and encrypting data to prevent such 
access even by service providers, such as SaaS storage providers, etc. Ideally, access even to 
encrypted data, and distribution of copies of encrypted data, should also be restricted as far as 
possible.
147
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 Such as the US warrants and Brazilian court orders against Microsoft and Google respectively – n. 110. 
143
 See n. 2. 
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 N. 36 and accompanying text. 
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 E.g., Google generates revenue by displaying advertisements to Gmail users that are targeted based on the 
content of their emails; if emails were encrypted so that Google’s software could not “understand” their content, 
Google’s ability to monetise user content in this way would be reduced. However, Google and other cloud 
providers are increasingly encrypting data and communications links following the Snowden revelations, 
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2015 http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/srg/opera/projects/csn. See n. 2. 
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 See n. 2. 
 21 
The former, the risk of states exercising jurisdiction over persons authorised to access intelligible 
data, may enable states to regulate the processing of that data wherever located, and seems more 
practical than basing jurisdiction on physical location of data, but potentially allows states to extend 
their jurisdictional reach to data physically located outside their territories. The extent to which states 
should claim jurisdiction over such processing or data when the interests of other states are involved, 
and how, will be discussed next. 
4. “Only” 
We now come to the “only” of “Europe-only cloud”, which we believe is, from a legal viewpoint, the 
crux of the fundamental problem underlying many unsatisfactory attempts to apply pre-digital laws to 
the cloud, and indeed the Internet more generally: that of multiple applicable jurisdictions and 
conflicting laws. The problem here is that many organisations may be subject to European laws – but, 
in today’s globalised world, they may not be subject only to European laws, particularly when digital 
data are involved. European organisations, particularly those that operate multinationally, will be 
subject to the laws of several states simultaneously. Similarly, if a non-European multinational 
organisation uses “Europe-only cloud” services, it would also be subject to multiple jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, it is not generally possible to guarantee European-only jurisdiction unless that jurisdiction 
is exclusive, which is not usually the case. 
 
When different states claim jurisdiction over the same organisation and, more specifically, its data 
processing, and complying with one state’s demands would break the laws of another state, the 
organisation is in the invidious position of having to decide which state’s laws to break. Thus, Belgian 
financial messaging transactions processor SWIFT, which had a second data centre in the USA 
“mirroring” its European processing, complied with US subpoenas for data processed in that data 
centre, which EU regulators considered put it in breach of EU data protection laws.
148
 
 
But how do organisations choose which state’s laws to break? A major factor may be the nature and 
severity of sanctions involved, from fines to imprisonment. This can result in a “sanctions arms race” 
of sorts, as states continue to change the balance of sanctions. As an example, the potentially huge 
fines (up to 5% of global turnover) under the proposed General Data Protection Regulation that is 
currently undergoing the EU legislative process.
149
 
 
Jurisdictional conflicts put organisations that operate multinationally in a difficult if not impossible 
position, including cloud providers and cloud users. This is a broader problem, for which the only long-
term solution is international agreement both on the extent to which and manner in which states 
should be able to claim jurisdiction with extraterritorial effect, and limits, transparency and 
accountability regarding mass surveillance of their own and other citizens’ data. Although the need for 
such agreement seems widely-acknowledged,
150
 the jurisdictional situation is complicated by states 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp128_en.pdf. It has since moved its second 
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increasingly attempting to extend their jurisdictions with extraterritorial effect,
151
 and even specifically 
prohibiting organisations from complying with other states’ laws.
152
 
 
How states eventually find a way to reconcile jurisdictional conflicts is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, we venture to suggest that it is worth considering whether it would be more sensible to base 
jurisdiction and conflict issues, not on something as fluid and dynamic as the data’s physical location, 
but on the relevant persons – the persons who control access to intelligible data, and the persons 
whose data it is (e.g. the data subjects, in the case of personal data). In the Microsoft warrant case,
153
 
the arguments have focused on the demanded data being stored in a data centre in Ireland, and 
whether therefore it is beyond US jurisdiction. Yet isn’t it equally or even more pertinent to ask 
whether the account holder, whose data are being demanded, is a US citizen or a citizen of a 
European state?
154
 
5. Concluding remarks 
As the above analysis has shown, the basic concern of states and their citizens regarding “their” data 
is twofold: that their laws, particularly the protection of fundamental rights, apply to such data, and that 
other states’ laws do not apply, particularly so as to enable governmental authorities to access that 
data. 
 
As regards the key legal and regulatory issues raised by the Europe-only cloud proposals, 
jurisdictional conflicts and extraterritoriality will be highly significant, as will human rights laws and the 
impact on fundamental rights such as privacy, data protection and freedom of expression. Issues may 
also arise under competition law and public procurement law. Trade law has already been mentioned, 
and it should be noted that the implications are multi-faceted. There are implications for intra-
European trade, competition law and the free movement of services within Europe, particularly if a 
Schengen cloud or Internet is intended to exclude the UK and Ireland.
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 Furthermore, members of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will have obligations under the multilateral General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), and other WTO commitments. European states have both multilateral 
and bilateral trade commitments; although some such obligations have provisions designed to 
safeguard fundamental rights. As such, to the extent that proponents of a Europe-only cloud argue 
that it is necessary to protect the privacy of European citizens, this may be permitted within the 
context of existing trade rules. 
 
Finally, the cloud market includes many regulated entities, who may be regulated under different, 
sometimes overlapping, sector-specific laws, such as information society services and electronic 
communications service providers. This means that the implications of Europe-only cloud for such 
entities will differ, depending on the regimes applicable to the relevant entities. Telecommunications 
law more generally will be relevant, for example whether net neutrality would be undermined by 
Europe-only cloud. 
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 E.g. Brazil’s solution to not requiring data localisation was wide extraterritoriality. Concerns have been noted 
e.g.: “…the law explicitly applies to any company anywhere that has at least one Brazilian user, has servers 
located in Brazil, or operates an office there, or effectively, all Internet companies on Earth.” 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elisugarman/2014/05/19/how-brazil-and-the-eu-are-breaking-the-internet/. Also “If 
other countries follow this approach… companies like his would have to contend with a bewildering array of 
national legislation. In some smaller markets, [Internet firms] might stop offering services altogether”. 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599781-brazils-magna-carta-web-net-closes. However, in other 
respects greater extraterritoriality may be positive for international co-operation, e.g. if a UK person hacks into a 
US server illegally, it might be considered helpful if the US had domestic powers to pursue that person. 
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 As with the “anti-FISA” provision introduced by the European Parliament in the draft Data Protection 
Regulation – n. 149. The Commission's original proposal also included specific provisions limiting disclosure 
made in compliance with laws, to those of the Member States and EU law (Art. 6(1)(c) and (3), and Art. 44(1)(d) 
and (4)). So, the Parliament's proposal simply built on this idea.  
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 See n. 110. 
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 There is also another issue, which needs consideration: the account holder’s email data may well include the 
data of yet other persons, European or otherwise. 
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 See n. 3. 
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Currently available technologies can be brought to bear, for example controls within networking 
infrastructure, improving the trustworthiness of the cloud software stack, and security technologies 
such as authentication, authorisation, encryption, monitoring and audit, so that in some situations 
"virtual jurisdiction" may be an alternative, and we suggest better, solution than restricting the physical 
location of data. In addition, we believe Information Flow Control (IFC) shows potential to address 
some of the problems raised here. Cloud deployment of IFC has not previously been investigated and 
this is under way in our project.
156
  
 
Our technical work aims at increasing transparency and control for cloud customers, to enable 
customer trust in cloud providers to be enhanced, and to ease provider compliance. But that alone will 
not be enough. In the battle for governmental control of access to digital data, users and services 
providers, of not just cloud computing but more broadly the Internet, are being caught in the middle. 
There is a pressing need for governments to act in good faith to seek to resolve these problems in a 
workable and technologically-neutral manner. 
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 See n. 2. 
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Appendix - Note on “jurisdiction” and Europe-only cloud 
 
The legal concept of jurisdiction is a slippery one. Even lawyers regularly misuse the term or, in order 
not to mislead their legal audience, have to qualify it with descriptors such as “effective”, “de facto” or 
“theoretical”. Non-lawyers are almost universally mystified by it. 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to attempt to reduce some of that mystery and confusion, particularly 
for a non-legal audience. 
1. Persons not things 
Law attempts to regulate social relations. Thus it only imposes obligations on persons, including legal 
persons such as corporations. It is incorrect and thus confusing to state that a law “applies” to a thing, 
such as the internet or a cloud service, or that a state asserts jurisdiction over that thing. In every 
case, the law will impose duties and/or confer rights on some person, such as the provider of a cloud 
service or its user. The days when animals or inanimate objects were subject to court proceedings, 
usually for causing the death of a person, are long past. 
2. Private disputes 
Where there is a dispute between two persons which is to be resolved by legal means, the first 
question is which court should decide the dispute. This is the most common usage of the term 
“jurisdiction”. If one of the disputants applies to Court A, and the other to Court B, the courts have to 
decide which of them should hear the dispute. This can happen even within the same state, but is a 
particular issue when the courts are located in different states. Each court will apply its own rules to 
decide the matter, and will either take jurisdiction over the dispute or decline jurisdiction. Usually, but 
not universally, the courts of each state respect the courts of other states, and so if Court A has 
already decided to take jurisdiction (applying its own rules properly) then Court B will decline to do so, 
even if its rules would permit it to take jurisdiction. 
 
This is, of course, not directly relevant to the question of a Europe-only cloud. But it does have 
indirect relevance because courts have the power to order the production of evidence, and this is 
routine in common-law jurisdictions. Thus if in our example Court A were a US court, it might well 
order production of data held in a Europe-only cloud service if that data were relevant to deciding the 
dispute. The person to whom that order was addressed, who might be a party to the dispute or even a 
complete outsider, such as a cloud service provider, would be in contempt of court if they failed to 
provide the data. The fact that doing so would be in breach of the law of a European state might not 
be sufficient as a defence. 
3. State regulation 
States always have jurisdiction to regulate persons who are physically present in their territory 
(confusingly, this is often referred to as their “jurisdiction”, using the term in a geographical sense). 
Their right to do this is rarely contested by other states. 
 
However, it is increasingly common for states to draft their laws so that as worded they apply to 
persons who are outside their territory – in the context of a Europe-only cloud, data protection laws 
are a very clear example. Quite what such wording achieves depends on a mixture of legal and non-
legal elements. 
 
From a purely legal perspective, these laws drafted with extraterritorial effect assert that the state has 
the right to regulate the specified activities by foreign persons. Unless there are legal limits on the 
state’s ability to make such an assertion, then as a matter of that state’s law, the law in question 
applies to the foreign person. However, the courts of a different state will not necessarily accept that 
assertion – a well-known example from the early days of the internet was the private action brought 
against Yahoo.com in the French courts for contravening the law against promoting Nazism by 
allowing Nazi memorabilia to be advertised on the yahoo.com website. The French courts decided 
against Yahoo, but a Californian court issued a judgment that the French court order could not be 
enforced against Yahoo by the US courts (though note that this judgment was overturned on appeal 
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on the sole ground that no enforcement threat had yet been made, an example of how the courts 
attempt to maintain respect for each other’s decisions where possible). 
 
There are few limits on a state’s power to draft laws with extraterritorial effect. International law 
contains the principle of comity, under which a state should not attempt to regulate an activity where 
the law of a different state would more appropriately control it. But there is an exception to this 
principle if the foreign activity has effect in the state, and as online activities tend to have global 
effects the principle does little to constrain lawmaking. In any event, the sanction for breach of this 
principle is no more than the disapproval of other states, which turns the matter from a legal into a 
political issue. 
 
The main international law limits on making laws with extraterritorial effect come from international 
treaties, under which states accept obligations to other states. In most cases there are no sanctions 
for non-compliance, but the benefits of the treaty are sufficient to deter states from passing 
contradictory law – the international intellectual property treaties are prime examples. One treaty 
which does contain a sanctions regime is the WTO Treaty, and in the online context Antigua has 
secured a judgment against the US on the basis that the US laws constraining online gambling are in 
breach of the treaty’s free trade provisions (but it should be noted that the US has not changed its law 
as a result of the judgment). Any law mandating the use of a Europe-only cloud would be at risk here, 
to the extent it would exclude non-European providers from the European market. 
 
States may also be subject to their own limits on extraterritorial lawmaking. For example, the US 
constitution contains two “due process” clauses, and a law which subjected foreigners to US law in 
contravention of those clauses might well be struck down as unconstitutional. A more likely limit, 
which would exist even in states without constitutional constraints, is restrictive interpretation of the 
law by the courts. A UK court has held that online use of a UK-registered trade mark does not infringe 
UK law if there is no attempt to sell goods or services to persons in the UK. A US court could use the 
due process provisions of the constitution to decide that it was unable to hear a prosecution of a 
foreign person, even if on the wording of the relevant law that foreign person had not complied with it. 
 
The final constraint on extraterritorial lawmaking is the state’s ability to enforce its law against foreign 
persons. This depends on such matters as extradition treaties, or the recognition of its national 
judgments in foreign courts. 
 
The consequence of all this is that it is rarely possible to give a straight answer to the question, “Does 
European state X have jurisdiction over a cloud service provider/user in non-European state Y?” Only 
if state X’s law is unlawful under its own law or constitution can we answer “No”.  If the provider/user 
has assets or staff in state X against which enforcement action can be taken, the answer is clearly 
“Yes”. 
 
Otherwise we are looking at matters of realpolitik, economics and business strategy, and the answers 
will depend on the players involved. A small business user with no future plans involving European 
state X might choose to ignore the law completely. A medium-sized player with ambitions to expand 
its business into Europe might choose to comply, even though currently state X has no means to 
enforce its law against that player. A global online business might treat the law as a starting point for 
negotiation, because of its market power within Europe and (perhaps) because its own state will exert 
political pressure on its behalf. Google has effectively been negotiating with the EU for years with 
respect to data protection law, though the discussion is couched in terms of what the law actually 
means rather than whether Google agrees with its content or will comply with the law. It is even 
arguable that Google’s response to the recent Google Spain judgment,
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 giving data subjects the 
right to have some search entries removed from searches, has been crafted as a negotiating tool 
rather than a simple compliance mechanism. We certainly can’t give a straight “Yes” or “No” answer 
here. 
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